Report on the investigation of

the grounding ofAstralon Princessa Shoal,East of Isle of Wight

10 March 2008

Statens haverikommission  Marine Accident Investigation Branch

Swedish Accident Investigation Board  Carlton House

Teknologgatan 8c  Carlton Place

Box 125 38 Southampton

SE-102 29 Stockholm  United Kingdom

SWEDEN  SO15 2DZ

Report No 4/2009 

January 2009This is a joint investigation report between MAIB and the Statens haverikommission 

- The Swedish Board of Accident Investigation (hereinafter referred to as SHK). The 

MAIB has taken the lead role pursuant to the IMO Code for the Investigation of Marine 

Casualties and Incidents (Resolution A.849(20))

Extract from 

The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping 

(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 2005 – Regulation 5:

“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping 

(Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 shall be the prevention of 

future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances.  It shall 

not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is 

necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 13(9) of 

the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, 

shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose 

purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

Further printed copies can be obtained via our postal address, or alternatively by: 

Email: maib@dft.gsi.gov.uk 

Tel:     023 8039 5500 

Fax:    023 8023 2459 

All reports can also be found on our website: 

www.maib.gov.ukCONTENTS PageGLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

SYNOPSIS 1

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 31.1 Particulars of Astral and accident 3

1.2 Narrative 4

1.2.1 Background 4

1.2.2 Anchoring 4

1.2.3 Events at anchor 6

1.2.4 Events during dragging 8

1.2.5 Events after the initial grounding 12

1.2.6 Other vessels 14

1.3 Ship damage 14

1.4 The Nab anchorage 15

1.5 Vessel traffic system 16

1.6 Princessa Shoal 16

1.7 Envionmental data 17

1.7.1 Ship’s weather forecasts 17

1.7.2 VTS weather forecast 17

1.7.3 Actual weather 18

1.7.4 Tides 18

1.8 Manning 18

1.8.1 Structure 18

1.8.2 Crew employment 20

1.8.3 OSM employment procedures 20

1.8.4 Training 21

1.8.5 Watchkeeping 21

1.8.6 Deck officers 21

1.9 Conduct of the anchor watch 23

1.9.1 Bridge equipment and passage planning 23

1.9.2 Anchor watchkeeping routine 23

1.9.3 Anchors and cables 25

1.9.4 IACS requirements 25

1.9.5 Guidance on anchoring 27

1.10 The ship owner and manager 28

1.10.1 Rederi AB Veritas Tankers 28

1.10.2 Organisation 28

1.10.3 Veritas procedures 28

1.10.4 Veritas internal audits 29

1.10.5 OCIMF SIRE programme 29

1.10.6 Swedish Maritime Authority 29

1.11 Previous accidents 30

1.11.1 Pasha Bulker 30

1.11.2 Young Lady 30

1.11.3 Statistics 31SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 322.1 Aim 32

2.2 Fatigue 32

2.3 Anchoring procedures 32

2.3.1 Master’s anchorage selection 32

2.3.2 Bridge procedures during anchoring 32

2.3.3 Position monitoring at anchor 32

2.4 Response to the deteriorating weather 33

2.4.1 Response to the weather forecast 33

2.4.2 Night orders 33

2.4.3 Main Engine Readiness 34

2.4.4 Reliance on anchoring equipment 34

2.5 Performance of the 2/ON on watch 35

2.5.1 Recruitment of the 2/ON 35

2.5.2 Monitoring of the 2/ON 35

2.5.3 Conduct of the anchor watch 35

2.6 Emergency response 36

2.7 Safety management 37

2.7.1 Safety management system 37

2.7.2 Auditing 37

2.8 VTS 37

2.8.1 Allocation of anchorage 37

2.8.2 Information flow and advice 37

2.8.3 Control of the anchorage 38

2.9 Knowledge and awareness of safe anchoring procedures 38SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 403.1 Safety issues directly contributing to the accident which have  

resulted in recommendations 40

3.2 Other safety issues identified during the investigation also leading  

to recommendations 41SECTION 4 - ACTION TAKEN 42

SECTION 5 - RECOMMENDATIONS 43Annex 1 Met Office Daily ABP Southampton Forecast 

Annex 2 Bramble Bank remote weather station data

Annex 3 IACS Requirements concerning mooring, anchoring and towing 

Annex 4  Admiralty Manual of Navigation, Volume 1 - Extract

Annex 5 Veritas Safety of Navigation Policy and Anchoring Procedures

Annex 6 Veritas Revised Procedures, implemented following the accident

Annex 7 MAIB Flyer to the Shipping Industry GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 2/ON - Second Officer - Navigation

2/OS - Second Officer - Safety

AB - Able bodied seaman

ADO - Automotive Diesel Oil

AMETIAP - Association of Marine Educational and Training Institutes Asia-

Pacific Regions 

ATSB - Australian Transport Safety Bureau

BA - British Admiralty

BTM - Bridge Team Management

BV - Bureau Veritas

CHA - Competent Harbour Authority

DCPSO - Duty Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer

DoC - ISM Document of Compliance

DPA - Designated Person Ashore

EBL - Electronic Bearing Line

ECDIS - Electronic Chart Display and Information System

ETV - Emergency Towing Vessel

GPS - Global Positioning System

IAMI - International Association of Marine Institutes

ICS - International Chamber of Shipping

ISF - International Shipping Federation

ISM - International Safety Management Code

kg - kilogram

kts - knots

Mb - Millibar

MCA - Maritime and Coastguard Agency

NI - Nautical Institutenm - Nautical mile

m - metre

mm - millimetre

OCIMF - Oil Companies International Marine Forum

OOW - officer of the watch

OSM - OSM Group

QHM - Queen’s Harbour Master

SHA - Statutory Harbour Authority

SIRE - Ship Inspection Report Programme (OCIMF)

SMA  - The Swedish Maritime Administration (The Flag State authority)

SMC - ISM Safety Management Certificate

STCW95 - International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 as amended

T - tonnes

UHF - Ultra High Frequency

UTC - Universal Co-ordinated Time

VHF - Very High Frequency

VRM - Variable Range Marker

VTS - Vessel Traffic Services

VTSO - Vessel Traffic Services’ Officer

Cable - 0.1 nautical mile – 185.2m

Navtex - Narrow band, direct printing system for transmission and 

reception of navigational and meteorological warnings

Shackle - 90 feet or 27.7m of anchor cable

All times used in this report are UTC+1 hour unless otherwise stated SYNOPSIS On 10 March 2008, the Swedish registered tanker Astral dragged 

her anchor in severe weather and grounded on the Princessa 

Shoal, east of the Isle of Wight.  Astral sustained indentations to 

her hull and extensive damage to her rudder and steering gear; 

there was no pollution and the vessel remained watertight.

Astral had anchored at the Nab Anchorage, 0.9 mile south of the 

Princessa shoal on 7 March to await a berth at Fawley Marine 

Terminal to discharge a cargo of diesel oil. 

On 9 March, increasingly severe weather forecasts were received predicting gale 

force winds from the south.  Later that evening the duty Vessel Traffic Services Officer 

(VTSO), monitoring the anchored vessels’ positions by radar, advised all the vessels 

at anchor of the weather forecast and recommended that their engines should be 

available if required.

During the early morning of 10 March the weather deteriorated as the wind increased 

to southerly force 10.  At 0650 Astral started to drag anchor to the north.  The officer 

of the watch (OOW) alerted the master at 0710 and requested the main engines, 

which were on 10 minutes notice, to be made ready for use.  The master arrived on 

the bridge 7 minutes after being called and dispatched the anchor party forward.  The 

engines were available for use at 0721 and the master applied power ahead, however 

the vessel continued to drag northward and grounded on the Princessa Shoal at 0725.  

Astral continued to drag and drift northward until her anchor held at 0855.  The vessel 

was taken under tow at 0958 by the tug Anglian Earl.

The managers of Astral have taken action to improve anchoring procedures on their 

vessels, and to conduct an additional pre-employment assessment of all officers 

recruited via manning agencies.  The local harbour authorities have taken action to 

improve the information available to seafarers about the tenability of anchorages in 

their harbour areas and approaches.

Recommendations have been made to the operators, to conduct checks to ensure 

their staff are familiar with, and comply with, their new procedures; to the ICS and NI 

to bring the lessons from the accident to the attention of their members; and to the 

local harbour authorities to provide guidance to the VTSOs on the style and conduct 

of their communication, to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding by non-native 

English speakers.

12Astral3- FACTUAL INFORMATION SECTION 1 PARTICULARS OF 1.1 AstrAl AND ACCIDENTVessel details

Registered owner : Rederi AB Veritas Tankers

Manager(s) : Rederi AB Veritas Tankers

Port of registry : Dons?

Flag : Swedish

Type : IMO Type II chemical tanker and oil tanker

Built : 2006

Classification society : Bureau Veritas

Construction : Steel – Ice class 1A

Length overall : 129.75m

Gross tonnage : 7,636

Engine power and/or type : 4320kW: MAK 9M32C

Service speed : 13.9 kts

Other relevant info : Single, variable pitch propeller.  Fish tail 

rudder.

Accident details

Time and date : 0725, 10 March 2008

Location of incident : 50o 39.9N 001o 01.9W 

Princessa Shoal, east of the Isle of Wight

Persons on board : 13

Injuries/fatalities : No injuries

Damage : Structural damage to rudder, steering gear 

and hull4NARRATIVE1.2 Background1.2.1 

Astral departed from Oil Tanking Jetty No.3 in Amsterdam at 1615 on 6 March 

2008, loaded with 9,800t of diesel oil (ADO10) for discharge at the Esso refinery 

at Fawley, Southampton Water.  The voyage was made in moderate conditions 

with south-westerly Beaufort force 5-6 winds.

Anchoring1.2.2 

On 7 March, Astral’s master contacted Southampton Vessel Traffic Services 

(VTS) 3 hours prior to arrival at the pilot station and was advised by the Vessel 

Traffic Services’ Officer (VTSO) that the berth was unavailable, probably until 13 

March.  As Astral approached the anchorage the master was advised to anchor at 

the Nab anchorage No.3, and that Astral might remain at anchor for several days 

until a berth became available.  

There were two vessels at anchor nearby as Astral made her approach to the 

No.3 anchorage.  The 143m long tanker LS Jacoba, which was also scheduled to 

berth at the Esso terminal, was already anchored in the adjacent Nab anchorage 

No.4.  The chemical tanker FS Vanessa was at anchor south of the boundary of 

No.2 and No.3 anchorages (Figure 1).Figure 1

Astral

F.S. Vanessa

L.S. Jacoba

Position of anchored vessels when Astral dropped anchor at 1545, 7 March 2008Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Ofce5

As Astral approached the Nab anchorage No.3 the second officer - safety (2/O 

S) handed over the bridge watch to the master, went forward with the anchor 

party and prepared the anchors for letting go, leaving the master and the 

helmsman on the bridge.  The master decided to anchor to the north of the No.3 

anchorage, due to the presence of FS Vanessa.  At about 1545 the port anchor 

was dropped and 7 shackles of cable veered.  The FS Vanessa weighed anchor 

and departed the anchorage, inbound to Southampton water at the same time.

Astral anchored in a charted depth of 15.6m on a seabed of gravel, sand and 

shell. The maximum tidal range was 4.3m.  Astral’s draught was 6.9m forward, 

7.6m aft on arrival.

Once the anchor was brought up1, the 2/OS returned to the bridge and took 

over the anchor watch from the master.  The position of the ship was plotted on 

the paper chart when the second officer returned to the bridge (Figure 2).  The 

position of the anchor had not been established and the bridge swinging circle 

around the anchor position was not plotted at the time. 1 Said of a ship when she rides to her anchor after dropping it. C.W.T. Layton – Dictionary of 

Nautical Words and Terms

Figure 2

 Extract of Astral’s chart showing plotted positions Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Ofce6

On arrival at the anchorage the range and bearing of Nab Tower was 070o by 

3.2nm and the bearing was observed to change between 068o and 071o as the 

vessel swung to wind and tide (Figure 1).

Events at anchor1.2.3 

The duty watch officers maintained an anchor watch alone on the bridge, with 

the watch AB available by UHF radio if required.  While at anchor, until the 

evening prior to the accident, the wind remained between south and south-west 

and force 5 to 7.  The Navtex 24 hour weather forecast issued by the Met Office 

at 0700 on 9 March, received on board Astral at 0844, stated:

Wight Portland – W5 to 7 to sev gale 9. Perhaps Storm 10 later. Mod 

or Rough incr very rough or high, shwrs then rain. Good becmg mod or 

poor.

At 1045, following receipt of the forecast, the master increased the scope of 

the port anchor cable to 8 shackles in the water.  At around 1930 the duty 

VTSO contacted Astral and advised the OOW of the forecast weather, and 

recommended that their engines be available if required.  The VTSO contacted 

all vessels at anchor in the approaches to the Solent and relayed the same 

weather information and guidance to them.  

The master considered the ship’s position, 9 cables from the closest danger 

of the Princessa Shoal, with the chief officer, and they agreed that there was 

sufficient time to start the main engine, weigh anchor and safely depart should 

the vessel start to drag her anchor.  The master briefed the officers in the mess 

room during the evening of 9 March, on the weather forecast, and informed both 

engineers that the engine should be ready to start if required.  

Later that evening the master wrote in his Night Order Book (Figure 3):

Check anchor position frequently.  If dragging call master and duty 

engineer immediately.  Listen CH12 and 16 all time. Have a good watch.

The chief officer handed over the watch to the 2/OS at midnight.  Shortly after 

midnight a Navtex weather forecast was received (Figure 4) that predicted:

Southerly storm force 10 expected soon.  

The 2/OS acknowledged receipt of the forecast and placed it on the clip on the 

aft bulkhead of the bridge.

At around 0200 the master awoke and looked out of his cabin window at the 

weather conditions.  He did not go to the bridge as he considered the weather 

conditions tolerable.7Figure 3

Astral Master’s night-orders for 9 March 2008

Figure 4

Weather forecast received 0041 on 10 March8

At 0300 on 10 March, the 2/OS handed over the watch to the second officer 

-  navigator (2/ON), who acknowledged the master’s night orders, noted the 

weather forecast, and then monitored the vessel’s position on the starboard radar, 

recording the ship’s position in the logbook each hour.

At 0600 the 2/ON recorded in the logbook the range and bearing of Nab Tower 

from the radar cursor as 070o x 3.42nm; the weather was recorded as south force 

10 with very rough seas.

Events during dragging1.2.4 

At around 0650 on 10 March Astral started to drag her anchor (Figure 5).

At 0654 the master of the vessel Alice, now anchored to the west of Astral, 

notified VTS that Alice was dragging anchor, that her main engine was running, 

and that the vessel would depart the anchorage.Figure 5Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic OfceAstral’s position at start of dragging anchor

Astral’s position 0650/10

Astral’s position 0001/109

At 0703, Astral’s speed over the ground was 2 knots in a northerly direction 

towards Princessa shoal.  

At 0704 the 2/ON observed the range and bearing of the Nab Tower from the 

radar cursor as 077o x 3.16nm (Figure 6), and wrote this in the logbook as the 

0700 position, but did not plot this on the chart.  The 2/ON believed that the 

discrepancy between this position and his previous position was due to the 

cable stretching2 in the deteriorating weather, moving the ship’s position to the 

north.

At 0705 the duty VTSO called Astral by VHF radio channel 12 and asked the  

2/ON if he was “happy with your position”. The 2/ON replied that he would 

check the position, and reported the range and bearing of Nab Tower to VTS. 

The VTSO then asked “confirm you are not dragging”, but no confirmation was 

given by the 2/ON.

At 0710 the 2/ON telephoned the master and told him the vessel was probably 

dragging, then contacted the first engineer, who was the duty engineer at the 

time, to advise him that the ship may be dragging anchor and to ask him to 

prepare the engine.  The first engineer quickly dressed and went to the engine 

room.

At 0717 the master arrived on the bridge and expressed his surprise to 

the 2/ON as to how much the ship had moved out of position.  The master 

immediately sent the 2/ON and the watch AB forward to prepare the anchor for 

heaving.  The master then phoned the engine room to order the first engineer to 

start the main engine as soon as possible.  

The engine needed to be blown over on air prior to starting, as it had not been 

recently started and was occasionally prone to cooling water collecting inside 

some of the cylinders.  At 0720, Astral’s engine was started and both steering 

motors were running.  The bow thrusters, usually fed by power provided by 

the shaft generator, could not be started as the shaft generator could not be 

synchronised with the main electrical distribution board. 

At 0721 the VTSO again contacted Astral, as the control of the engine was 

transferred to the bridge, asking the master to confirm his intentions; the master 

replied that he had started his engine and he would proceed to sea.  The master 

applied 38% pitch ahead which, in calm conditions, would have produced a 

speed through the water of around 5kts, aware that the engine had recently 

started and was not yet at the correct operating temperature.  The master 

considered that dropping the second anchor would hinder, rather than help his 

current situation, by increasing the risk of fouling the anchors.2 Stretching cable is the extension of the anchor cable along the seabed as the ship pulls the 

cable tight.10Figure 6Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Ofce0725 Grounds - stern rst

0721 Engine to Bridge Control

0717 Master on bridge

0710 OOW calls Master/Engineer

0700 Astral position - Radar x

0700 Astral position - GPS x 

0650 Astral position  

0001 - 10/03/2008 Astral position  

07/03/2008 Anchor position  

1 mile

Positions of Astral during dragging11

Astral’s bow remained pointing to the south as the vessel dragged northward, 

taking seas over the bow as the vessel pitched and rolled moderately in the 

southerly seas and short swell. The waves steepened as the vessel entered the 

shallower water.

Astral grounded stern first at 0725 and again at 0726 in charted depths of 

between 6.5 and 8m (Figure 6).  At 0726, the master called VTS by VHF radio, 

stating that Astral was aground and requested tug assistance.

It was immediately apparent to the master that the vessel had lost steering and 

the rudder indicated hard over to starboard, an angle of 72o (Figure 7).  An 

inspection by the chief engineer showed substantial damage to the steering 

gear, the steering motor and the adjacent hull structure, with no water ingress 

evident.  As the rudder angle indicator chain arrangement had been snapped by 

the impact it was not possible to identify the actual position of the rudder.

The condition of ballast tanks was monitored remotely, and indicated that the 

vessel was watertight.  The master then advised the Rederi AB Veritas Tankers’ 

(Veritas) Designated Person Ashore (DPA) and directors of his situation.Figure 7

Damaged rudder indicator

Rudder angle  

indicator

Broken rudder angle  

indicator chain12

Events after the initial grounding1.2.5 

Astral continued to drag anchor northwards over the Princessa Shoal, 

manoeuvring with engine only as the port anchor was slowly recovered.  The 

wind was recorded at Bramble Bank, sheltered to the north of the Isle of Wight 

as gusting 62.5 kts from the south.  At 0730 Solent Coastguard contacted 

Astral to co-ordinate assistance, and advised Queen’s Harbour Master (QHM) 

Portsmouth of the incident.  QHM Portsmouth dispatched the tug Bustler (Figure 

8), manned only for harbour towage, from within Portsmouth Harbour.  

The off duty Emergency Towing Vessel (ETV) Anglian Earl (Figure 8) was 

anchored off Yarmouth Harbour in the western Solent, and Solent Coastguard 

requested its help in assisting Astral.  The Port of Southampton’s duty 

harbourmaster permitted Anglian Earl to transit the Solent area without a pilot 

on board.  The Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s (MCA) duty counter pollution 

and salvage officer (DCPSO) was kept informed throughout and co-ordinated 

the commercial contract between both vessels’ operators.

At 0748 Astral’s port anchor was aweigh, with power now provided to the bow 

thrust unit from an additional auxiliary engine.

As Astral continued to drift northwards, east of the Bembridge ledge buoy, the 

master manoeuvred the ship with main engine and bow thruster, believing that 

the rudder was hard over to starboard.

At 0817 the port anchor was let go to 7 shackles on deck, and the vessel 

continued to drift northwards over the Nab Shoal, west of the New Grounds 

(Figure 9).  The rising spring tide prevented Astral from subsequently 

re-grounding.   Bembridge lifeboat arrived on scene at 0820 and reported that 

there was no visible sign of pollution.

The coastal oil tanker Rathrowan, which was anchored in the Saint Helens Road 

anchorage, started her engines and prepared to weigh anchor as her master 

became aware of the approaching Astral.

At 0843 Bustler rendezvoused with Astral and stood by.  

At 0855 Astral’s port anchor held at the north-west extremity of the New 

Grounds.  Anglian Earl arrived at 0925, and with her own wire made fast to 

Astral at 0958.  Astral weighed anchor and was taken in tow to the north east, 

clear of the bank, to await the arrival of a pilot and an additional tug.  At 1045 

the manual sounding of all Astral’s tanks was complete and the ship was 

confirmed as watertight.

The harbour pilot boarded at 1110 and the harbour tug Lady Madeleine 

was made fast aft at 1323.  Astral was then towed through the Solent and 

Southampton water to berth alongside, with harbour tug assistance, at berth 

40/41 in Southampton. 13Figure 8

Tug Bustler

Anglian EarlImage courtesy of FotoFlite

Image courtesy of FotoFlite14

In accordance with Veritas’ procedures, the master and senior officers were 

tested for drugs and alcohol when the vessel arrived alongside, with none 

detected.

Astral subsequently transferred to Fawley Marine Terminal to discharge her 

cargo and gas-free the tanks.

Oter vessels1.2.6 

Of the four vessels anchored in the Nab anchorages 1-8 that night, only 

Anemos 1, south of Astral, remained at anchor through the night, both Alice and 

Mare Adriacum dragged anchor prior to Astral.  Two other vessels, anchored 

at the Saint Helens anchorage, also dragged their anchors, and steamed clear 

of danger.  All the vessels that dragged anchor communicated their plans and 

actions with VTS, on VHF channel 12. ShIP DAMAGE 

1.3 Extensive damage was caused to Astral’s fish tail rudder, which was cracked on 

both sides along 80% of its length.  Her steering gear had been lifted vertically 

from its mountings and landed back on the mounting bolts, stripping the threads 

or shearing all the securing bolts.  The steering gear room shell structure, shell Figure 9

Track of Astral

Astral’s anchor holds

0958 Tug Anglian Earl fast

Copy of chart showing Astral’s positions following groundingReproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Ofce15

plating and frames were significantly damaged (Figure 10) as the rudder was 

thrust upwards.  The rudder was removed and placed on deck before the vessel 

was towed to Denmark for repairs.  

The Bureau Veritas (BV) Survey report in the Fredericia Shipyard in Denmark, 

between 27 March and 16 April noted that the vessel’s bottom plating had 

severe indents and scratches in several places.  Bottom plating, totalling around 

84m2 and damaged frames were replaced (Figure 10).

There was no pollution and the ship remained watertight.ThE NAB ANChORAGE

1.4 The Nab anchorage was developed by the Port of Southampton and the 

Dockyard Port of Portsmouth to manage the anchoring of waiting vessels, and 

to keep them from anchoring directly in the approaches to the pilot boarding 

position at the Nab Tower.  Twelve designated anchoring positions, 8 inner and 

4 outer anchorages (Figure 11), are situated between 2.5 and 6.5nm south-

west of Nab Tower in depths between 15 and 27m.  Of the 8 inner anchorages, 

1 lies entirely within, and 4 lie partially within the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth 

Statutory Harbour Area (SHA) (Figure 5).  Figure 10

Damage to Astral16

NAB anchorage No.3 has a minimum charted depth of 15.5m and is designated 

for use by vessels up to 250m in length.  

Tankers arriving at Fawley Marine Terminal routinely anchor in the Nab 

anchorage waiting to berth, occasionally for several days during busy periods.VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM

1.5 The eastern approaches to the Solent lie in the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth’s 

SHA, but as the channel is primarily the approach to the Port of Southampton, 

following an agreement between the two ports, ABP Southampton is the VTS 

Authority and the competent harbour authority (CHA) for the area (Figure 12).  

Vessels at anchor within the Nab anchorage are monitored by Southampton 

VTS.  The VTSO manually marks a circle around a target and visually monitors 

the target to identify when a vessel is dragging. When a vessel reported to be at 

anchor moves from the circle, the vessel is contacted by the VTSO and advised 

accordingly.  The vessel’s course and speed are tracked and can be relayed to 

the vessel. PRINCESSA ShOAL

1.6 Princessa Shoal (Figure 6) lies 1nm east of the Isle of Wight shore line and 1nm 

north of the most northern Nab anchorages.  Marked on its west side by the 

West Princessa Light-buoy, it has a least charted depth of 6.4m. The seabed is 

rock.Figure 11Reproduced from Admiralty Chart BA 2037 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic OfceChart showing overview of NAB anchorages17ENVIRONMENTAL DATA1.7 Ship’s weather forecasts1.7.1 

The Met Office sea area forecast for the 24 hours from 0500UTC Sunday 9 

March 2008 for sea area Wight predicted:

Westerly 5 to 7 backing southerly 7, occasionally Gale 8, perhaps severe 

Gale 9 Later.  Moderate or rough increasing very rough or high.  Showers 

then rain. Good becoming moderate or poor.

The Navtex weather forecast received on the bridge of Astral at 1800 on 9 

March predicted south west winds Force 8-9 later for the Wight area.  

The Navtex weather forecast received at 0041 on 10 March stated: 

Southerly storm force 10 expected soon (Figure 4).  

VTS weather forecast1.7.2 

The bespoke Met Office forecast received by the Port of Southampton VTS 

office for the Solent, Spithead, Southampton Water and the Docks issued at 

0524 on 9 March (Annex 1) stated:

General situation : Showers will die out during the evening ahead of 

a front, which will bring heavy rain and gales, perhaps severe, to the 

Southampton area overnight and through tomorrow [10th]Figure 12

CHA areas18

The forecast for 0700 on 10 March was for:

S’ly winds of 40 knots, gusting 60 knots. 

Specifically from 1800 9 March to 0700 10 March: 

Wind: Southwest force 3 or 4 (10 to 15 Kn) backing southerly force 

7 to severe gale 9 (30 to 45kn gusts 45 to 60kn) tonight and veering 

southwest force 6 to gale 8 (25 to 30 kn gusts 35 to 45 kn) after dawn.

Actual weather1.7.3 

The weather recorded on board Astral showed that at midnight, prior to the 

accident, the weather was recorded as cloudy, slight seas, good vis, wind ssw’ly 

force 5-6, barometer 1004mB.  

At 0400 the weather was recorded as overcast sky, very rough seas, good vis, 

wind s’ly force 10, barometer 998.

The wind recorded at the remote weather monitoring station at Bramble Bank 

in the Solent (Annex 2), showed that at 0545 UTC, 0645 ship’s time, the 

wind increased to 40kts with gusts of 48kts. It is likely that the wind speeds 

at the more exposed Nab anchorage were greater than those recorded at the 

monitoring station. 

Tides1.7.4 

The spring tide had occurred the day before the accident, with the tide being 

one of the lowest predicted for the year.

Low water in the approaches to Bembridge harbour, Isle of Wight occurred at 

0713 on 10 March with a predicted height of 0.6m above chart datum.  A tidal 

surge caused by the low pressure weather system increased the height of low 

water by 0.9m above the expected tide providing 1.5m of tidal height at low 

water and 1.6m at the time of the grounding. 

The Admiralty tidal stream atlas for The Solent and Adjacent Waters is shown 

for 0644 and 0744 on 10 March (Figure 13).  The tide can be seen to change 

from slack water to a NNE’ly flow of around 1kt at the time Astral started to drag 

anchor.  MANNING

1.8 Structure1.8.1 

Astral, with a minimum manning requirement for 10, was manned by 13 crew.  

The senior officers were Swedish, with the exception of the first engineer, who 

was a Polish national. The junior officers and crew were Filipino.  The master, 

chief engineer, chief officer and first engineer worked 4 weeks on, 4 weeks 

off, while the Filipino officers usually worked on board for 5 months.  Veritas 

operated a zero tolerance policy on the consumption of alcohol on board its 

vessels.19Figure 13a

Figure 13b

Tidal fow at 0644 (ship’s time)

Tidal fow at 0744 (ship’s time)20

As the Veritas fleet had expanded from two vessels to three, the employment 

and retention of suitably qualified officers had proved difficult and it was 

taking time to place desirable, permanently employed, officers on each of the 

company’s vessels.  On board Astral, the temporary 2/ON had been employed 

to fill a gap prior to the permanent officer returning to the vessel, the search for 

a third permanent second officer was ongoing.

Crew employment1.8.2 

The European crew were employed directly by Veritas.  The Filipino crew were 

employed through the manning agents OSM group (OSM).

OSM is an independent marine-services provider offering high-quality offshore 

and ship management and consultancy services as well as navigation and 

engineering solutions and financial planning. OSM is based in Norway and has 

offices in Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Russia, Greece, Germany, 

Hong Kong, the Philippines, India, China, Singapore and USA3.

OSM employment procedures1.8.3 

OSM’s employment acceptance procedures are illustrated in the flow diagram 

shown at Figure 14. 3 www.osm.noYES

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

 NO

 NO

 NO

 NO

 NO

RejectReject

Reject

Reject

End

RejectFUNCTION 1

(on-line Applications)Required personal

Information to be

completed

Seaman access

the OSM website

Applicant to document

all qualifications within

7 days

Passed?

Fill-Up Application Form 

and Collect Seaman’s

Document

Check Historical

Sea Service

Qualified?

Assign Employee

N / Encode Sea

Service

CES Exam

For

Database

Purposes

For future

references

Registered 

in 

Database

Passed?

Passed?

Approved?

Acceptable

Final 

Assessment

Background

Check

Technical

Interview

Conditional

Management 

Team

DiscretionFUNCTION 1

(Walk-in Applications)Assign Employee

In Encode Sea

Service

Approved

Applicant

(In-House)Flowchart-Processing for

New ApplicantsLegendResponsible PersonsManagement TeamHead of Crewing Operations

Documentation Supervisor/

Documentation Officer

Deck, Engine &

Steward AssessorsFigure 14

OSM employment process21

Training1.8.4 

Officers who were permanently employed by Veritas were provided with Bridge 

Team Management (BTM) training.  While the master and chief officer had 

attended a BTM course, the 2/ON in temporary employment had not received 

this training.  However, he had attended a Bridge Resource Management 

Course and Ship Simulator and Bridge Teamwork training in February 2000, with 

a previous employer.

Onboard training was provided by a Seagull training system which delivered 

specific computer based training for each rank.  This training included instruction 

in the use of electronic charts and navigation for all deck officers.

Watchkeeping1.8.5 

The chief officer and two second officers kept the three bridge watches.  They 

worked a slight variation on the 4 on 8 off system, in accordance with the 

company’s Safety Management System (SMS) as detailed below. 

Rank Watch Times Watch Times

Chief Officer 0800 -1200 2000 - 2400

Second Officer 

(Safety)

1200 -1700 2400 - 0300

Second Officer 

(Navigator)

1700 -2000 0300 - 0800

Deck officers1.8.6 

The master?

The 49 year old master had been in rank for 8 years, the last 3 years with 

Veritas.  When his previous employment had come to an end he had been 

headhunted by the managing director of Veritas as a suitable master. The 

master had served exclusively on smaller tankers during his 26 years at sea, 

mainly on the 2,907 GRT 1972 built Dalan?s.  The master rejoined Astral 

in Amsterdam, a few days prior to the accident, when he took command 

following a half day handover from his predecessor.  

The master had been on leave for 4 weeks prior to joining.  During his 

previous contract he had noted that the 2/ON, on watch at the time of the 

accident, required careful monitoring in some navigational duties, and spent 

time on the bridge with him when he perceived the need to assist the officer.22

The previous master?

The master of Astral prior to the vessel’s departure from Amsterdam was not 

usually employed by Veritas and had been retained on a temporary basis. 

During his time on board Astral he maintained a “hands on” approach with 

the bridge team, remaining on the bridge whenever he felt it necessary to 

monitor the navigation of the ship.

The chief officer?

The chief officer held an STCW II/2 certificate of competence and had 10 

years experience on tankers; he joined Veritas in June 2007 as chief officer 

on board Astral.

The second officer (navigator)?

The 2/ON, who was on watch at the time of the accident, held an STCW II/3 

certificate of competence as a bridge watchkeeper.  He had been employed 

on a temporary basis for 2 months while the vessel’s permanent second 

officer took leave.  He was the ship’s navigator and was responsible for 

passage planning.  This was his first contract as a second officer on tankers, 

having previously served as third officer on tankers and as a second officer 

on bulk carriers, trading primarily deep sea.  

During his time on board he had been assisted in his watchkeeping duties 

by the master and in his navigation and other duties by the 2/OS.  His 

performance had been considered weak by the master on board at the time 

of the accident.  The previous master had not considered it necessary to 

specifically supervise the 2/ON, but he routinely spent significant periods of 

time on the bridge with the officers.  Both masters had provided assistance 

to the 2/ON during busy periods of watchkeeping.  However, the incumbent 

master felt that any shortfalls in the performance of the officer were 

manageable, especially given that the 2/ON was due to be relieved shortly.  

In coming to this view, the master also took into account that a replacement 

for the 2/ON was unlikely to be provided ahead of the scheduled return to 

the vessel by the vessel’s permanent 2/ON.

The 2/ON was a light sleeper, who required around only 4 hours sleep per 

night.

During the selection process conducted by OSM, the 2/ON was noted as 

giving a “very good” general impression during his interview in October 2007 

and noted as being “re-hireable”. 

Despite recording a “below average” score for intellect, the officer passed 

OSM’s selection criteria for the position with Veritas due to his age being 

over 50.  Had he been under 50 years old, an “average” score would have 

been required.23

OSM’s report on the 2/ON also noted that while he scored “average” in 17 of 

the 19 categories of “personality traits and characteristics”, he scored low in 

the “relaxed” and “assertive” categories.

The selection process had also included:

? A Marlins International Shipping Federation (ISF) English Language Test 

for Seafarers in which he scored 76%

? A computer based test at Operational Level for an oil tanker deck officer 

in which he scored the following marks, achieving a Total Test Score of 

57%?Cargo Handling - 65%?Control function - 50%?Fire Fighting - 50%?Navigation  - 50%?Survival - 86%

? A psychological test and interpretation by an accredited clinic that 

included:?Sack’s sentence completion test?Draw a person test ?Intelligence Test (IQ)

Second officer (safety)?

The officer, who was off watch at the time of the accident, had been on board 

for 4 months; his first contract with Veritas.  He had 10 years experience 

working on tankers similar to Astral.CONDUCT OF ThE ANChOR WATCh

1.9 Bridge equipment and passage planning1.9.1 

The bridge was fitted with a Furuno Integrated Bridge system.  The electronic 

chart system was not an ECDIS, and a fully corrected paper chart folio was 

carried.  Passage planning, berth to berth, was mainly carried out on the 

electronic chart and transferred to the paper charts.  The anemometer was not 

working at the time of the accident.

Ancor watckeeping routine1.9.2 

Once at anchor, the routine followed by the OOWs on board Astral, was that 

the ship’s position was to be monitored to determine whether the anchor had 

dragged.  If the vessel dragged anchor, the master was to be informed, the 24

engine started, and the anchor recovered if necessary.  The master had used 

this method previously and had successfully recovered a dragging anchor on 

several occasions in a range of weather conditions.

Each OOW monitored the vessel’s position by two methods of their choosing, 

in compliance with the company and master’s instructions.  An anchoring and 

anchor watch checklist was completed during each watch (Figure 15), and  

each OOW noted the range and bearing to Nab Tower in the bridge logbook 

each hour. Figure 1525

The chief officer monitored the vessel’s position history by reference to the 

electronic chart radar range and bearing of Nab Tower using the Variable Range 

Marker (VRM) and Electronic Bearing Line (EBL), and by occasionally plotting 

the ship’s position on the paper chart.  He also set the GPS anchor drag alarm 

on the vessel’s position at the start of his watches. 

The 2/OS also used the electronic chart to monitor the ship’s position, and 

plotted Astral’s position on the paper chart.  He also monitored the radar range 

and bearing of Nab Tower using the VRM and EBL.

The 2/ON monitored the vessel’s position by noting the range and bearing of 

Nab Tower by the radar cursor, and visually monitored the GPS position. He did 

not plot the ship’s position on the chart. Figure 16 shows the radar display used 

by the 2/ON, showing the position of the cursor and the relative position of the 

VRM, EBL and the Nab Tower as the vessel drags anchor until the time the  

2/ON calls the master and duty engineer.

None of the bridge watchkeepers had plotted a bridge swinging circle on the 

chart, and no clearing bearings or ranges had been established.  The GPS 

anchor drag alarm had been set at 1 cable from the vessel’s position when 

used, rather than at the anchor position. 

Anchors and cables1.9.3 

Astral was fitted with two Bureau Veritas (BV) approved 4050kg M Spek 

anchors, with 56mm common stud link chain.  Nine shackles of cable were 

carried on the starboard side, and 10 shackles on the port side.

IACS requirements1.9.4 

The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Requirements 

concerning mooring, anchoring and towing (Annex 3) states: 

The anchoring equipment required herewith is intended for temporary 

mooring of a vessel within a harbour or sheltered area when the vessel is 

awaiting berth, tide, etc.

The equipment is therefore not designed to hold a ship off fully exposed 

coasts in rough weather or to stop a ship which is moving or drifting.  In 

this condition the loads on the anchoring equipment increase to such a 

degree that its components may be damaged or lost owing to the high 

energy forces generated, particularly in large ships.

The anchoring equipment presently required herewith is designed to hold 

a ship in good holding ground in conditions such as to avoid dragging of 

the anchor.  In poor holding ground the holding power of the anchor will 

be reduced.26Figure 16a

Figure 16b

At anchor

Astral starts to drag anchor at 065527

Guidance on anchoring 1.9.5 

The ICS Bridge procedures guide states that:

On anchoring, a fix on the drop position should be made and the ship’s 

swinging circle ascertained, based on the length of cable in use….

The master should be immediately notified if the ship drags her anchor, 

and if sea conditions or visibility deteriorate.

MGN 315(M), issued by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) 

gives information and guidance on the keeping and maintenance of a safe 

navigational watch in accordance with the requirements of STCW 95. It states 

that while at anchor:

The OOW shall determine and plot the vessel’s position on the appropriate 

chart as soon as practicable.

Further guidance is provided in seamanship text books and extensively in the 

Admiralty Manual of Navigation, Volume 1, which provides an example of best 

practice for establishing an anchor watch.  A copy of the relevant section is at 

Annex 4.Figure 16c

Watch ofcer calls master at 071028ThE ShIP OWNER AND MANAGER1.10 Rederi AB Veritas Tankers1.10.1 

Originally founded in 1926, Rederi AB Veritas tankers (Veritas) is a family 

owned shipping company with its origin in the bunkering trade based in Dons?, 

Sweden.  Veritas owned and operated three similar sized product tankers that 

traded mainly in the Baltic and North Sea.  Astoria, built for Veritas in 1999, and 

Astina, purchased in 2006 were both on long term time charter to Finnish Neste.  

Astral, purchased 6 months after completion in April 2007, was time chartered to 

Clearlake Shipping.

 Organisation1.10.2 

Veritas’ headquarters is situated on the Swedish Island of Dons?. The managing 

director, who is a master mariner, is the grandson of the company’s founder.  He 

is the DPA and is responsible for the company ISM and Vetting.  The managing 

director’s brother is the deputy managing director and the crew manager.  Also 

in the office of six managers was a master mariner, who assisted with auditing, 

acted as relief master on occasions, and who had recently re-written the 

company’s SMS. 

Veritas procedures1.10.3 

The company’s re-written SMS was implemented during the early part of 2007. 

The Veritas ‘Night Order Book’ contained the Veritas Safety of Navigation Policy, 

signed by the managing director (Annex 5), which stated that:

While masters bear the ultimate responsibility, the safety of navigation policy 

requires all officers and crew members to prevent situations arising, which 

may endanger those onboard the ship, her cargo, or the environment.

A separate document, the company’s Shore Management Bridge Standing 

Orders (Annex 5), with regard to anchoring stated:

A proper bridge watch shall be maintained by a certified Deck Officer when 

the ship is at anchor.

The ship’s position shall be fixed at the time of anchoring and checked 

frequently thereafter. The swinging circle of the ship is to be charted, 

centred on the position of the anchor. Particular attention is to be paid to 

the ship’s movements during the change of tidal direction and changes in 

weather conditions.  The master is to be informed immediately if there is 

any suspicion that the ship is dragging anchor or if the charted position falls 

outside the charted swinging circle.

A copy of the Shore Management Bridge Standing Orders was contained in the 

Night Order Book, the ship’s copy of which was signed as being acknowledged 

by the master and OOWs.29

The overarching SMS manual provided an additional procedure for 

watchkeeping at anchor (Annex 5) stating that the:

Officer of the watch checks the following:

Position with more than one means of fixing method?

Anchor shapes and lights?

Movement of other anchored ships in relation to own ship?

Weather sea and tide?

VHF channel 16 and other channels for the actual traffic area and ?

telex

Veritas internal audits1.10.4 

Internal reviews of the SMS were carried out annually in accordance with the 

ISM Code, by the managing director or the deputy auditor, the office-based 

master.  The most recent audit was completed on 27 October 2007.  

The SMS review process required the company’s internal auditor to establish the 

following:

Have all the present bridge officers read and signed the Master’s standing 

orders and company bridge standing orders?

The current master and the on leave chief officer had not signed the Company 

Bridge Standing Orders, and a corrective action was raised to add this 

requirement to the handover checklist for each officer on board.

An Internal Navigation Review, with the auditor on board, was carried out on 

11 October 2007 during which no observations were made regarding Astral’s 

anchoring procedures.

OCIMF SIRE programme1.10.5 

The Oil Companies International Marine Forum’s (OCIMF) 6-monthly Revised 

Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) Programme was carried out by Preem Petroleum 

AB on 4 May 2007, with no navigational deficiencies noted.  

Swedish Maritime Authority1.10.6 

The ISM Document of Compliance (DoC) and Safety Management Certificate 

(SMC) were issued by the Swedish Maritime Authority; the vessel’s SMC was 

issued on 2 November 2007.30PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS1.11 1.11.1 Pasha Buker

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau Report4 investigated the grounding of 

Pasha Bulker.  The main conclusions of the report are summarised as follows.

On 23 May 2007 the Panamanian Registered bulk carrier Pasha Bulker 

anchored along with more than 50 other bulk carriers to await berthing to load 

coal in Newcastle, on the east coast of Australia.  At midday on 7 June the 

master veered more cable on receipt of a gale warning.  During that evening 

seven ships put to sea.  At midnight, the